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Abstract
Starting from an industry where production is provided by a public monopolist, we look
at the effects on the consumers’ surplus of a sequence of reforms in network industry. Using
a simple comparative statics framework, we find indifference conditions in consumers’ sur-
plus between respectively public monopoly, unregulated private monopoly, regulated private
monopoly, vertically disintegrated monopoly, duopoly and liberalized market. The results are
determined by the relative size of the x-inefficiencies of the public monopolist, allocative in-
efficiencies of private monopoly, the cost of unbundling and costs related to establishing a
competitive market.
JEL: D40, L51, L32, L33
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1 Introduction
Aim of this paper is to show in a very intuitive way the welfare effects of switching from a public
vertically integrated monopoly to other different market’s forms. In particular, we analyze five
market’s reforms: (i) the unregulated privatization of the public monopolist, (ii) the regulated
(via price-cap) privatization of the public monopolist, (iii) the unbundling of the integrated
industry, (iv) the establishing of a duopoly by opening the market to an incumbent and finally
(v) full market opening.
We characterize the model by considering a linear market’s demand, we compute the con-
sumers’ surplus in the five different scenarios and we compare the results with the starting
point. The differences will arise both from the different suppliers’ objective functions and from
the different marginal costs borne by the different suppliers.
The benevolent public monopolist will maximize the consumers’ surplus and will bear a marginal
cost higher than the efficient one (because of x-inefficiencies). The unregulated private monop-
olist will be technically efficient and it will maximize profits. The same will happens for the
regulated private monopolist, but it will be forced to charge a lower price than the unregulated
one. In the duopoly set-up the incumbent will set quantity and price to maximise profits, the
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entrant will do the same on the residual market demand. Under market opening the firms will
choose quantity in order to have price equal to marginal cost. Both the institution of a duopoly
and market opening will generate the loss of economies of integration: again the marginal cost
will be higher than the efficient one.
We will conclude that it cannot be established the welfare dominance of a specific reform
pattern in comparison with different arrangements including public monopoly.
2 The Model
The starting point of our exercise is a market where there is a public monopolist. We refer to a
network industry such as, for instance, electricity or fixed telephone (see for example Newbery
(1999)). We assume that the public monopolist faces a linear market demand curve:
pPu = a− bq
and that the marginal costs (cPu) are constant and higher than the marginal costs of a
competitive market (c), because of some inefficiency (α > 0):
cPu = c(1 + α)
Moreover, we assume that the public monopolist’s problem is to maximize consumers’ sur-
plus. Hence, the production takes place where market demand equals public monopolist’s
marginal costs:
qPu =
a− c
b
and the consumer consumers’ surplus is just the area below the market demand function
and above the marginal costs (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Public Monopoly
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Let us now assume that the public monopolist is privatized (see for an extensive analysis
Vickers and Yarrow (1988)). We assume that a desirable result from privatization is realized:
since the private monopolist has incentive to minimize costs, its marginal cost is the market
2
efficient marginal cost: c. The monopolist’s problem becomes now to maximize profits. There-
fore, at the optimal choice of output we have marginal revenues equals marginal costs. Given
the linear demand described above, the marginal revenue function is:
MR(pUPr) = a− 2bq
The optimal output is:
qUPr =
a− c
2b
The unregulated private monopolist charges the maximum price it can get at this level of
output (we assume price discrimination is not feasible):
pUPr =
a+ c
2
The consumers’ surplus is now the area between the demand function and the price charged
by the firm, which is greater than the marginal cost (see Figure 2).
Do we get any improvement, in terms of consumers’ surplus, moving from a public mo-
nopolist to an unregulated private one? The answer depends on how inefficient is the public
monopolist, in particular it depends on the relation:
α ≶ a− c
2c
If α is small enough, it is better an inefficient public monopolist than a private one.
Figure 2: Public vs. Unregulated Private Monopoly
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For instance, the economy represented in Figure 2 on the left will loose surplus after the
privatization of the public industry. On the other hand, the right-hand side graph depicts a
case where privatization leads to a better market equilibrium, from the consumers’ point of
view. Hence, in order to rank the two different markets based on consumers’ surplus evaluation,
we need to be able to compare the x-inefficiency of the public monopolist with the allocative
inefficiency of the private one.
In order to limit the deadweight loss associated with the monopolist’s equilibrium, we assume
that the government appoints a regulator who fixes a maximum price the monopolist can
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charge. Seeking for simplicity, we model this price-cap as the maximum tolerated mark-up (β)
above the competitive market’s marginal cost:
pˆ = c(1 + β)
The regulated private monopolist keeps production at its optimal level:
qRPr =
a− c
2b
but now it can charge just pˆ.
Hence, consumers’ surplus increases for sure in comparison with the unregulated private monopoly.
But, again, nothing can be stated, a priori, on the welfare dominance between public and reg-
ulated private monopoly because it depends on the relation:
β ≶ 2a(c+ 4cα)− a
2 − c2(1 + 8α+ 4α2)
4(a− c)c
Therefore, the reform has a positive impact on consumers’ welfare only if β (the maximum
tolerated mark-up) is smaller than some function of the public monopolist’s inefficiency α,
as depicted in the following Figure 3, right graph. On the other hand (Figure 3, left), the
regulatory reform will reduce consumers’ surplus.
Figure 3: Regulated Private vs. Public Monopoly
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Let us suppose now that a new reform is implemented: the regulator imposes the unbundling
of the network operator (see for example Pollitt (2007a), Willner (2008)). For instance, it forces
the separation of supply from generation. Note that consumers’ preferences are not influenced:
the market’s demand function is the same as before.
But we can reasonably assume that dividing the production process into different steps
increases costs since we are loosing economies of integration: for example, we are duplicating
administration costs and principal-manager incentives’ problems. Hence, costs faced by the
firm are higher than the competitive marginal cost:
cUn = c(1 + γ)
4
Figure 4: Unbundling vs. Public Monopoly
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Once again, it can be both the case that the reform increases consumers’ surplus, as depicted
in Figure 4 on the left, when the public monopolist’s technical inefficiency is high enough:
α > γ
or that it makes consumers’ worse-off (as in Figure 4 on the right), when unbundling-related
costs are high enough:
α < γ
In the next step of the reform the regulator offers a new license establishing a duopoly in
the consumers’ retail market. To simplify, we follow here Chamberlin’s small groups’ model,
Chamberlin (1933)). The new entrant faces the residual market demand (the thick segment
in the picture) left by the incumbent and higher costs (for example, it bears costs for an
advertising campaign).
5
Figure 5: Duopoly vs. Public Monopoly
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The competition arising from the duopoly entails a lower equilibrium price (the incumbent
has to follow the price set by the entrant since the good is homogeneous) and higher production
than the private monopoly’s. On the other hand, using the same arguments as in the unbundled
market, costs increase (cD = c(1 + δ)). With respect to the starting point (integrated public
monopolist), consumers’ surplus can be both higher (Figure 5, left graph) or lower (Figure 5,
right graph): the result depends on the relative size of public monopolist’ inefficiency α and
duopoly inefficiency δ:
α ≶ a− c
c
− 1
4
√
3a2 − 6ac+ 3c2 + 8acδ − 8c2δ + 4c2δ2
c2
In the last step of the reform, consumers’ retail market is opened to competition.
Following the Cournot model with many firms ( Cournot (1897) and Varian (1987), pp. 452-
453), let us suppose there are n firms and let q = q1 +q2 + · · ·+qn be the total industry output.
We can write the firm’s profits’ maximizing condition as:
MR = MC
p(Y ) +
∆p
∆Y
yi = cn
We can rewrite the second condition as:
p(Y )
[
1 +
∆p
∆Y
Y
p(Y )
yi
Y
]
= cn
Recall that ∆Y
∆p
p(Y )
Y
is the definition of elasticity of the aggregate demand curve |(Y )|, and
let si =
yi
Y
be the i− th firm’s share of total market output. The above condition becomes:
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p(Y )
[
1− si|(Y )|
]
= cn
p(Y )
[
1− 1|(Y )| /si
]
= cn
We can think of |(Y )| /si as the elasticity of the demand curve facing the single firm:
the smaller the market share of the firm, the more elastic the demand curve it faces. Note
that if si = 1, the firm is a monopolist, and the condition boils down to the unregulated
monopolist’s. If, instead, the firm market share tends to zero, the condition reduces to that of
pure competitor: price equals marginal costs.
Figure 6: Market Entry vs. Public Monopoly
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To keep things simple, in our model firms are all similar to each others, and have the same
level of marginal costs. Nevertheless, note that we index marginal cost by the number of firms
operating in the industry cn = c(1 + ), in a way that: 1 < 2 < · · · < n. Marginal costs are
an increasing function of the number of firms in the market, and this is because of the loss of
economy of scale and integration.
In the same way as in the previous steps of the reform process, the result of the market
opening in terms of consumers’ surplus depends on the relative size of the public monopolist
and private firms’ inefficiencies:
α ≶ n
If the x-inefficiencies of the public firm (α) are bigger then the technical and allocative
inefficiencies of the different types of private firms (n), the public monopoly is still a better
solution for the network industry (Figure 6, left). On the other hand, when n < α, market
opening is desirable reform (Figure 6, right)
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3 Conclusion
We have shown that would make the consumer indifferent, in welfare terms, indifferent between
public and private provision of services in network industries under different market structures.
The analysis has been carried out in a merely theoretical way. For the discussion of the policy
implication of different reform patterns see for example Willner and Parker (2007) or Pollitt
(2007b).
The relative size of consumers’ surplus depends, even in the basic model we have discussed, on
a wide list of information. We need to know whether and to what extent the public monopoly
is inefficient, whether the regulator is strict in setting the price-cap for a private monopolist
and how much inefficiency is created by unbundling and market opening. Therefore it seems far
from being obvious that a standard package of reforms across countries and industries would
be always and everywhere welfare improving.
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